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14. ABSTRACT <p>U.S. military planners continue to avoid focusing truly on conflict termination and Phase IV operations. Conflict termination and post-conflict operations planning failures highlight the need for a doctrinal paradigm shift which institutionalizes the notion that the decisive, military aspect of a war ends during Phase IV instead of during Phase III.</p> <p>Major combat operations are just <i>enablers</i>. One must not regard the military aspect of proper conflict termination complete until after security and stability operations. Doctrinally transferring security and stability operations from Phase IV into Phase III would greatly reinforce the “decisive” nature of Phase III; if the inherent task is potentially violent, then the military must do it and holistically plan for it as part of Phase III.</p> <p>Campaign planning must become more interagency in conduct. Modification of Joint Pub 5-00.1 is necessary to require the review of campaign plans by the Department of State and other key non-DOD agencies as necessary. Initial planning itself must become interagency in nature. Despite recent incremental improvements, the existing construct is still too focused on interagency <i>coordination</i> rather than interagency <i>integration</i>.</p> <p>Only the military retains the capacity to lead the effort in achieving the desired strategic end-state following conflict; doctrine must adapt to force operational planners to face reality. In this age of the “strategic corporal,” one must realize the approach to the art of operational planning must be strategic.</p>					
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THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO OPERATIONAL PLANNING

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The Strategic Approach to Operational Planning

U.S. military planners continue to avoid focusing truly on conflict termination and Phase IV operations. Conflict termination and post-conflict operations planning failures highlight the need for a doctrinal paradigm shift which institutionalizes the notion that the decisive, military aspect of a war ends during Phase IV instead of during Phase III.

Major combat operations are just *enablers*. One must not regard the military aspect of proper conflict termination complete until after security and stability operations. Doctrinally transferring security and stability operations from Phase IV into Phase III would greatly reinforce the “decisive” nature of Phase III; if the inherent task is potentially violent, then the military must do it and holistically plan for it as part of Phase III.

Campaign planning must become more interagency in conduct. Modification of Joint Pub 5-00.1 is necessary to require the review of campaign plans by the Department of State and other key non-DOD agencies as necessary. Initial planning itself must become interagency in nature. Despite recent incremental improvements, the existing construct is still too focused on interagency *coordination* rather than interagency *integration*.

Only the military retains the capacity to lead the effort in achieving the desired strategic end-state following conflict; doctrine must adapt to force operational planners to face reality. In this age of the “strategic corporal,” one must realize the approach to the art of operational planning must be strategic.

“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.”

- Carl von Clausewitz¹

On April 16, 2003, General Tommy Franks triumphantly arrived in Baghdad and told his top commanders to make plans to leave in as early as sixty days, stating that the more than 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would shrink to about 30,000 troops by September.² In light of the difficulties encountered by Coalition forces following the announced end of major combat operations on May 1, 2003, one might argue that senior American military leaders were extremely naïve and woefully unprepared for the events that followed. Historians undoubtedly will uncover myriad factors for the poor preparation and execution of American forces in Phase IV, or the post-hostilities transition phase of the Iraqi campaign.³ Sadly, the United States has compiled a weak post-Cold War record with regard to Phase IV operations. A major reason is the inability of the United States to plan and execute proper conflict termination and post-hostilities operations.

There is no shortage of articles, papers and books stating that proper conflict termination is critical and its consideration merits the utmost attention of the commander. Most of these opinions would probably elicit little argument from its readers—few would disagree with the very Clausewitzian principle that belligerents fight wars for political purposes. If most recognize the criticality of proper conflict termination in winning a better peace, why do conflicts seldom properly terminate? This question might seem glib in light of the innate complexities of war, much less its conclusion. However, one can argue that

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.

² Michael R. Gordon, “The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War,” *New York Times*, 19 Oct 2004, A1.

³ Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Doctrine for Joint Operations*, defines the four phases of a campaign or major operation as follows: Phase I – *Deter/Engage*; Phase II – *Seize Initiative*; Phase III – *Decisive Operations*; Phase IV – *Transition*.

despite the philosophical exhortations by its most distinguished practitioners in support of proper conflict termination, American war planners continue to practice an operational art which fundamentally excludes real consideration for conflict termination. What is necessary is an overhaul of joint doctrine, specifically the joint planning process. Simply put, and despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, U.S. planners continue to avoid focusing truly on conflict termination and Phase IV operations. A doctrinal paradigm shift which institutionalizes the notion that the military aspect of a war ends during Phase IV instead of during Phase III might go a long way toward preventing the short shrift often given to conflict termination and post-hostilities operations.

An Opportunity? Secretary Rumsfeld's Directive

On September 17, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a draft directive, titled *Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities*, which set into motion broad Defense Science Board recommendations concerning U.S. capabilities in dealing with Phase IV challenges.⁴ At the operational level, the draft directive designates the Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC) as the joint commander responsible for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations. In addition to developing and maintaining contingency operational campaign plans spanning the entirety of a potential campaign, including “activities and operation during peacetime, stabilization and reconstruction,” regional combatant commanders must involve outside (non-Defense Department) experts to support planning and operations.⁵ Furthermore, the draft directs the

⁴ Department of Defense, *Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities*, DoDD 3000.cc (draft) (Washington, D.C.: 17 September 2004).

⁵ Ibid., 9.

development of joint doctrine for stabilization and reconstruction operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

The directive, tantamount to an acknowledgement of poor campaign planning for Iraq, is appealing in that it mobilizes the defense establishment at all levels to attack the problem. Perhaps the most crucial effort pushed by the directive is that of the development of joint doctrine. How does one develop or modify doctrine to effect better results during Phase IV? An exploration of past experiences reveals to the joint commander clear doctrinal problems, including: (1) ignoring proper conflict termination with planning overly focused on Phase III operations; (2) lack of a doctrinal understanding of the military's role in Phase IV; (3) planning in a sterile, non-interagency environment.

Ignoring Conflict Termination

“Winning,” according to Bruce Clarke, is “getting the losing side to change its political objectives to accommodate the winner’s.”⁶ To win means creating conditions, or an end-state, which fulfill the objectives set by national leadership. As objectives are generally political in nature, the desired end-state is heavily political as well. The swift destruction of an enemy's military center of gravity is not an end to itself but is an enabler for achievement of the desired end-state. Too often, however, the commander's planning process correctly identifies the enemy operational centers of gravity (COG), destroys them, and declares victory with only token appreciation for the actual end-state created in the aftermath.

U.S. actions in Panama in support of Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989-1990 highlight the American preoccupation with rapid, decisive operations with relatively little concern for

⁶ Bruce B. G. Clarke, “End-State Planning: The Somalia Case,” in *Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success*, ed. Max G. Manwaring and Wm. J. Olson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 52.

the aftermath. Operational planners were far from completing the planning for the post-conflict phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, at the initiation of hostilities.⁷ Fourteen years before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the rapid elimination of effective Panamanian defense forces complicated the task of stabilizing the small state as widespread looting and vandalism took hold.⁸ The operational objectives of the Panama operation mostly matched the national objectives: (1) safeguard the lives of nearly 30,000 U.S. citizens residing in Panama; (2) protect the integrity of the Panama Canal and 142 U.S. defense sites; (3) help the Panamanian opposition establish genuine democracy; (4) neutralize the Panama Defense Forces (PDF); (5) and bring Noriega to justice.⁹ Phase III planners viewed the disarming and dismantling of the PDF as the primary operational objective, in essence focusing away from the greater strategic objective of establishing a stable democracy in Panama.¹⁰ U.S. forces targeted the destruction of the PDF as the Panamanian center of gravity and efficiently executed its plan to do so. However, in the wake of the complete collapse of the PDF, the appearance of widespread looting, civil disorder, and “Dignity Battalions” threatened the key national objective of establishing democracy. An operational objective had interfered with a national objective. The bottom line: the U.S. military pursued its own operational objectives and concomitant centers of gravity with relatively little regard to the strategic issue of stability in Panama. Removing Noriega and destroying the PDF does little to stabilize Panama if other criminals fill the resultant power vacuum.

⁷ Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003), 4; available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB182.pdf>; accessed 9 January 2005.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ronald H. Cole, *Operation JUST CAUSE: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988–January 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, 1995), 29; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/justcaus.pdf>; accessed 9 January 2005.

¹⁰ Ibid., 14.

The point to consider here is whether the strategic-operational mismatch simply reflects an error (albeit a large one) made during the planning process or reflects a flaw in the planning process itself. The fact that planners from separate directorates initially planned Operation JUST CAUSE (technically encompassing only the decisive operations phase) and Operation BLIND LOGIC (the precursor to Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY) and designed the plans to be independent of each bolsters the argument that true regressive planning with the strategic end-state in mind would have been difficult to achieve.¹¹

One of the U.S. national policy objectives during the 1990-91 Gulf War was to achieve the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.¹² To partially account for this objective, General Schwarzkopf and his staff developed the operational objective of destroying Republican Guard forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO).¹³ While setting aside questions over the correctness of the national objective-operational objective match, a close look at Schwarzkopf's pronouncement of mission accomplishment following the utter destruction of Iraqi forces in Kuwait is telling of the U.S. planning mindset. Apparently, the operational objective had become an end to itself. The destruction of Iraqi units in the KTO, along with other operational objectives, meant the end of the war, regardless whether national strategic objectives had been met or not. Furthermore, the static focus (by political as well as military leaders) on the operational objective placed little emphasis on the enemy's mindset, which actually regarded Schwarzkopf's announcement and subsequent actions at the Safwan talks as an opportunity to escape from

¹¹ John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 14.

¹² Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: 1992), Vol. 1, 38.

¹³ Jeffrey E. Fondaw, "Conflict Termination—Considerations for the Operational Commander" (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 16 May 2001), 11-12.

defeat. Gordon Brown, Schwarzkopf's chief foreign policy adviser at CENTCOM recalled, "We never did have a plan to terminate the war."¹⁴

Clearly, the blind pursuit of potentially mismatched operational objectives is not the sole blame for the ills of conflict termination problems. At the operational level, however, the joint force commander must recognize the inherent flaw in a planning process which produces an operational objective focused on decisive operations (Phase III). Joint Pub 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, advises the campaign planner to "plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves."¹⁵ Yet it then blithely discusses arriving at operational enemy centers of gravity (it offers "a powerful element of the adversary's armed forces" as an example for an operational center of gravity in a major conflict) which creates the unwitting effect of shedding all previous strategic considerations to the sidelines.¹⁶ It overstates the importance of the operational center of gravity by stating the "importance of identifying the proper COG cannot be overstated."¹⁷ The destruction of the enemy center of gravity does *not* equate to victory, yet campaign plans continue to focus on attaining the holy grail of operational center of gravity destruction during Phase III operations. General Schwarzkopf was ready to send his troops home after destroying Iraqi forces in the KTO; he even admitted as much to the enemy at Safwan!¹⁸ Twelve years later (and some argue, during the latter stage of the same conflict), General Franks displayed the same mindset of desiring to wrap up operations once Baghdad fell.

¹⁴ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 461.

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Joint Pub 5-00.1 (Washington, D.C.: 25 January 2002), II-4.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, II-8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Gordon and Trainor, 447.

Supporters of the “shock & awe” strategy during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) touted the speed and low casualties produced by the “transformational” U.S. forces’ run to Baghdad. Unfortunately, a RAND Corporation study argues, history shows “that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult postconflict stabilization can be.”¹⁹ Furthermore, the RAND study concluded that “the higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.”²⁰ Despite the compelling evidence put forth by the RAND study and others, decision makers continue to focus on Phase III operations when considering operational design and weighing the risk of casualties. The First Cavalry Division, slated to follow the initial invasion force in Iraq, halted its deployment process once the success of Phase III became evident, irrespective of any projections for Phase IV conditions.²¹ Major Isaiah Wilson, an Army war planner during OIF, claimed that commanders did not produce a formal Phase IV plan for OIF until November 2003, seven months after Baghdad fell.²²

Conflicts do not end until the enemy ceases to resist, regardless of the “victor’s” destruction of the enemy’s operational centers of gravity and the attainment of operational objectives. Embedded in Phase IV operations is stability operations, which includes combat (among other instruments of power) operations to remove remaining resistance and establish security. “[T]o compel our enemy to do our will,” as Clausewitz defined a war’s purpose, is understandably difficult when battling ideology, terrorism and non-state actors.²³ However, surely the destruction of the Republican Guards and the toppling of Saddam from power

¹⁹ James Dobbins and others, *America’s Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 165-166.

²⁰ Ibid., 166.

²¹ Gordon, A11.

²² Thomas E. Ricks, “Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan,” *Washington Post*, December 25, 2004, A18.

²³ von Clausewitz, 75.

during OIF did not mean victory was at hand; their destruction was just a major enabler, not the true end-state. Realizing a desired political end-state usually requires concerted action during Phase IV—Phase III operations merely set the stage. At the minimum, proper conflict termination demands the establishment of security and stability to foster development of the desired end-state. The initial responsibility of establishing conditions for security and stability belong to the military.

Phase IV Is Still War

“If you went to the Pentagon before the war, all the concentration was on the war... If you went there during the war, all the concentration was on the war. And if you went there after the war, they’d say, ‘That’s Jerry Bremer’s job.’”²⁴

Again, the Panama operation offers historical parallels and lessons ignored. General Maxwell Thurman, U.S. Southern Command commander, admitted that his post-hostilities plan was “not suitable for the reconstruction of Panama because it did not accurately assess the dimensions of the task... [I]t was a plan based on the hope that life would quickly return to normal, people would go back to work, and schools would reopen. Unfortunately, this was a faulty premise.”²⁵ Furthermore, the splitting of the campaign planning into two separate processes, one for war fighting and one for post-conflict operations ensured the focus would be on war fighting as an independent entity. At the operational commander’s level, therefore, the planning “bifurcation turned postconflict restoration into an afterthought.” One end result was the assignment of only one military police battalion to provide security for numerous convoys and key facilities and restore law and order in the

²⁴ James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004); available <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200401/fallows>; accessed 17 January 2005. Quote attributed to Frederick Barton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

²⁵ Richard H. Schultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause* (Maxwell Air Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 18.

entire country.²⁶ General Thurman even admitted the joint force commander's task was "to conduct the strike force operation and get out."²⁷ Two months after the invasion and the ensuing post-conflict chaos, Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, XVIII Airborne Corps commander, maintained that there were no lessons learned, including any concerning doctrine, from the conflict.²⁸ His conceit is troubling (and likely representative even today) in light of his acknowledgement that there was "insufficient attention [given] to postconflict strategy."²⁹

General Franks' desire to send troops home prematurely is just one example in a long line of incomplete conflicts fought in the classic American way of war. In addition to violating the principle of fighting a war to achieve an enduring political end-state, U.S. leaders either displayed a reluctance to thoroughly plan or revealed a shameful ignorance of Phase IV operations. Major Wilson indicted U.S. leaders and planners for conceiving of OIF "far too narrowly" and regarding post-invasion operations "as someone else's mission." Because of the coalition failure to "see Operation Iraqi Freedom in its fullness," the U.S. military remains "perhaps in peril of losing the 'war,' even after supposedly winning it."³⁰ The Third Infantry Division, according to its after-action report, stated that it "transitioned into Phase IV in the absence of guidance."³¹ One would regard the omission of a mature Phase IV plan as tantamount to negligence when considering the enormous casualties suffered during this phase. The reasons are many in explaining this tragedy. Operationally speaking, however, a major problem is that U.S. doctrine does not focus on Phase IV.

²⁶ Crane, 4.

²⁷ Schultz, 19.

²⁸ Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: the Storming of Panama*, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 393.

²⁹ Schultz, 19.

³⁰ Ricks, A18.

³¹ Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Iraq without a Plan," *Policy Review Online* No. 128 (December 2004-January 2005): 3; available <http://www.policyreview.org/dec04/ohanlon.html>; accessed 16 January 2005.

Despite all the pretty quotes from famous theorists adorning each joint doctrine publication chapter advising to the contrary, at its essence, U.S. doctrine continues to treat Phase IV as an animal separate and distinct from the glorious decisive operations of Phase III. Phase IV assumptions such as the Iraqi people would welcome coalition forces as liberators or that Iraqi security forces and government agencies would be adequate for providing much of the stability following the Baathist regime's downfall were, in retrospect, highly optimistic. Such planning assumptions represent a cardinal sin in that planners essentially assumed away capabilities inherent within an occupied and armed population. An outside observer would encounter difficulty in discerning if planners had any developed branches required in their Phase IV plan to overcome potential deficiencies in their assumptions. One might conclude that the campaign planning discipline usually found in Phase III operations was wanting in a Phase IV demonstrating little ownership. Therefore, the U.S. military finds itself hard-pressed to achieve even clearly stated national objectives when the objectives reside within the realm of Phase IV rather than Phase III.

Planning with Blinders on

U.S. joint doctrine dedicates an entire publication, Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, to the issue of interagency coordination. Specifically regarding campaign planning, the publication clearly states it “should integrate the elements of national power by synchronizing the efforts and optimizing the varied and extensive resources of many agencies and organizations toward a single objective or end state.”³² This

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations (Vol. 1)*, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, D.C.: 9 October 1996), II-14.

statement is representative of the advisory nature of the publication, which merely serves to remind the operational planner that interagency coordination is important.

Operation JUST CAUSE, often touted as an early example of successful, joint military operations in the Goldwater-Nichols era was also an abysmal example of poor interagency coordination. The planning process was “highly compartmented, and it excluded interagency drafting and coordination. The plan was restricted to the Department of Defense...”³³ Despite prevailing Army low intensity conflict doctrine which made integration of effort with other governmental agencies an imperative, such coordination never existed and Panama plunged into chaos soon after the invasion.³⁴

A perfunctory search on the Internet reveals a wealth of government and private scenario studies regarding the aftermath of an Iraqi invasion. Perhaps the most well-known one was a Department of State-led effort titled the Future of Iraq Project. Once President Bush placed the Department of Defense in charge of the nation building effort, however, the “State Department and other interagency conflict termination and nation building efforts were dropped, ignored, or given low priority.”³⁵ Tragically, many of these studies had challenged the very post-conflict assumptions mentioned earlier.

Despite doctrine advising to the contrary, operational planners continue to give interagency coordination considerations uneven attention in part because the guidance is weak. Interagency coordination thus falls victim to the political whims of the moment. Where doctrine is firmly directive, one finds little which support interagency coordination. Joint Pub 5-00.1 mentions the importance of interagency coordination but where it offers

³³ Schultz, 18.

³⁴ James T. Jackson, “Just Cause: Some Lessons Learned” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2 April 1992), 24.

³⁵ Anthony Cordesman, “Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerrilla War?” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 July 2003), 11.

meaningful and directive operational planning guidance, it is silent on the subject. Joint Pub 5-00.1 specifically states that only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, the Joint Staff, the services and other designated *defense* agencies conduct one or both of the required reviews during deliberate planning.³⁶ Joint Pub 5-00.1 contributes one paragraph concerning interagency coordination at the end the deliberate planning chapter and mentions nothing about such coordination in the chapter devoted to crisis action planning. One might argue that other bodies such as the National Security Council's Principals Committee is by design an interagency entity. However, at the operational level, current doctrine requires no agency outside the Department of Defense to contribute to the planning of campaigns.

Prior Voices

An Armed Forces Staff College paper written in 1994 similarly argued for a greater focus on conflict termination considerations during crisis action planning. The authors recommended the inclusion of additional conflict termination guidance, to include evaluation and confirmation of conflict termination criteria, in all six crisis action planning phases of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).³⁷ The problem with their conclusions is they did not go far enough. Merely to remind decision makers and planners of the importance of conflict termination does not alter the fundamental construct of the JOPES process, which remains centrally focused on Phase III operations.

³⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Joint Pub 5-00.1, III-13 and III-17.

³⁷ Robert R. Soucy II, Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II, "War Termination Criteria and JOPES: A Dangerous Omission in U.S. Crisis Action Planning" (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 25 March 1994), 14-15; available http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/p180.pdf; accessed 17 January 2005.

John Boulé recommended the institution of an intriguing, separate, interagency “operations transition planning cell” which would focus on post-conflict operations.³⁸ His ideas have merit and the recent Defense Science Board recommendations largely support his views. His assertions remain somewhat less than truly transformational, however, when he reveals that the establishment of such a cell would allow the main body of planners to stick to “military” matters. Boulé thus preserves the problematic separation of Phase III planning and Phase IV planning. The same planning group must tackle post-conflict issues as well as decisive operations issues. To do otherwise would violate the spirit of the principle of regressive planning. One wonders if the establishment of a peripheral cell is enough to provide the proper focus on Phase IV operations. An OIF Phase IV planner confided to a reporter: “All the A-Team guys wanted to be in on Phase III, and the B-team guys were put on Phase IV.”³⁹

James W. Reed best captured the essence of the problems inherent in the planning process when he stated “the current gap in our operational doctrines regarding conflict termination seriously hampers our ability to plan effective military campaigns.”⁴⁰ Reed exhorted planners to embrace fully the concept of regressive planning with an eye to conflict termination characterizing not the end of hostilities but merely the transition point to a civil-military post-conflict phase. He, too, however stops short of offering concrete doctrinal changes in the actual planning process.

³⁸ John R. Boulé, “Operational Planning and Conflict Termination,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn/Winter 2001/2002): 98.

³⁹ Fallows, 26

⁴⁰ James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,” *Parameters*, (Summer 1993): 49.

Recommendations

“Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as scaffolding on which the commander can rely on support at any time. ...no matter how versatile the code...theory conflicts with practice.”

- Carl von Clausewitz⁴¹

Clearly, none of the issues raised are new or revolutionary. Legions of war college students learn the importance of conflict termination and Phase IV operations each year. Yet, the U.S. military continues to underachieve in reaching desired strategic end-states following armed conflict. One problem is that the existing doctrinal planning construct remains oriented largely toward military-only, decisive operations focused on operational objectives for the particular phase. When planning in accordance with existing doctrine does not achieve the desired result, the doctrine must change—the current system does not work! The second problem is the lack of institutional, systematic interagency planning conducted at the operational level which unwittingly contributes to the continued narrow, major combat operations focus in most campaign plans. Offered below are two recommendations to address these problems by perhaps providing enough changes to allow an improved conception of campaign planning; the current, conventionally-oriented doctrine is still a paradigm trap causing too many to conceive of war too narrowly.

1. Operational objectives must reflect the desired end-state following the achievement of stability, not after major combat operations. Major combat operations are just *enablers*. One must not regard the military aspect of proper conflict termination complete until after stability operations. Ironically, Secretary Rumsfeld stated at the beginning of OIF that one of the major military objectives was “to help the Iraqi people

⁴¹ von Clausewitz, 140.

create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that country.”⁴² Despite the announcement of such an objective, the focus at the operational planning level remained glued to Phase III objectives. Achieving security and stability is a task relegated to the backwater Phase IV. Yet, the achievement of security and stability following a major combat operation is the cornerstone in the establishment of the desired strategic end-state. Doctrinally transferring initial security and stability operations from Phase IV into Phase III would greatly reinforce the “decisive” nature of Phase III. This seemingly cosmetic change acknowledges the human tendency to focus on the task at hand; Phase III planners would have a better opportunity to plan decisive operations which efficiently effect the desired political end-state. Furthermore, considering that campaign planning phases are not linear—preliminary Phase IV operations begin well before the conclusion of Phase III—incorporation of security and stability operations into Phase III should aid in true regressive planning.

Instead of security and stability operations, Nadia Schadlow offers the term “governance operations” to distinguish post-conflict operations integral to war from other broad peace operations and humanitarian assistance missions. Schadlow states that governance operations “are those political and economic tasks necessary, as combat winds down, to establish relative political stability so that an eventual transition to a permanent political authority can take place.”⁴³ The distinction is critical, Schadlow argues, because the squishy lumping together of most post-conflict operations and peace operations has the effect of blurring the focus on those specific post-conflict operations which are part of war and

⁴² Rumsfeld, Donald H., “DOD News Briefing,” (The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 21 March 2003); transcript available http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03212003_t0321sd1.html; accessed 5 February 2005.

⁴³ Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” *Parameters*, (Autumn 2003): 86.

“reinforces the tendency to avoid planning for governance operations in tandem with planning for combat operations.”⁴⁴ Imperative to the changing of the military’s institutional mindset and its doctrine is the accurate definition of and distinguishing between the myriad post-conflict operations. Every war will require a different toolbox of post-conflict operations. Whether called governance or security and stability operations, if the inherent task is potentially violent, then the military must do it and holistically plan for it as part of Phase III. One cannot avoid history which shows that most wars require operations beyond the defeat of an enemy army or capture of the capital to achieve truly the strategic desired end-state.

The above recommendation might raise a few eyebrows as the incorporation of stability operations threatens to make Phase III too broad and unwieldy—a veritable jack of all trades and a master of none. Such an all-encompassing phase might upset the logic of creating phases in the first place. However, doctrine is not meant to be rigid but to focus effort uniformly. The commander could and probably would split this new phase III into more manageable parts while retaining the planners’ new ability to provide more far-reaching courses of action. Incorporating key stability operations responsibilities into Phase III actually clarifies, not obscures, the missions and objectives of Phase III. Critical facets of security and stability operations are intrinsic to most Phase III military end states—furthermore, the troops participating in major combat operations must often provide the initial (and critical) security and stability anyway.

2. Campaign planning must become more interagency in conduct. No longer should one regard the incorporation of experts from other federal agencies (and perhaps from critical

⁴⁴ Ibid.

non-governmental agencies) as a necessary evil required to form ad hoc staffs in times of crisis. Modification of Joint Pub 5-00.1 is necessary to require the review of campaign plans by the Department of State and other key non-DOD agencies as necessary. Initial planning itself must become interagency in nature. As previously mentioned, Boulé's operations transition planning cell has some merit but fails to truly integrate interagency planning and promote genuine regressive planning.

Too often, one confuses interagency *coordination* with actual *integrated* interagency *planning*. Others point to the often large groups of interagency planners on joint staffs but fail to realize that due to the ad hoc nature of most interagency efforts, the experts from the State Department or Treasury Department rarely provide their expertise to the fullest potential—often the foundation of an operational campaign design has already been irrevocably mislaid to an extent which no amount of ensuing interagency coordination can fix. The ad hoc nature of these efforts also means that unprepared, non-DOD participants may not fully understand the military planning construct and objectives and prove to be a detriment more than an advantage, therefore violating the principle of unity of effort.

Regional combatant commanders retain political advisors (POLADs), often imminently qualified and distinguished State Department experts. POLADs, however, are part of the combatant commander's special staff and not part of J-3/J-5 as fully integrated planners. The maturing Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept is promising to some extent by providing worker-level non-DOD experts to the commander's staff. Yet, even the JIACG remains a *coordinating* entity separate from the J-5-led Joint Planning Group. In essence, the JIACG concept remains a religion that requires buy-in from institutional non-believers. To truly tap the potential created by the JIACG concept requires

concrete doctrinal changes incorporating the JIACG concept provided with major modifications, namely the dissolution of the JIACG as a separate entity and the full integration of its former members into existing planning groups and cells in the J-3/5 directorates.

Conclusion

“The object in war is to attain a better peace... If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought of the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.”
- B. H. Liddell-Hart⁴⁵

The above recommendations do not represent the complete solutions to nagging problems with conflict termination and post-conflict operations. Instead, they represent specific fixes to effect proper operation planning to reflect the many sermons heard but usually forgotten. There is a danger in forcing lessons from the last war and therefore planning for the last war; the next conflict likely will be one very different from OIF. However, planning principles remain valid and the Clausewitzian purpose for war remains poignant. Philosophical arguments aside, no other organization outside the military can decisively lead the achievement of the desired political end-state following conflict; doctrine must adapt to force operational planners to face reality. In this age of the “strategic corporal,” one must realize the approach to the art of operational planning must be strategic.

⁴⁵ B. H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), 366.

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